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Abstract. Homomorphic encryption is an encryption method that enables com-
puting over encrypted data. This has a wide range of real world ramifications
such as being able to blindly compute a search result sent to a remote server
without revealing its content. This paper discusses how database search queries
can be made secure using a homomorphic encryption scheme. We propose a new
database search technique that can be used with the ring-based fully homomor-
phic encryption scheme proposed by Braserski.
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1 Introduction
According to a recent study, 74% of smartphone users use a location based service (such
as Google Maps) to find directions and other location based information [1]. Moreover,
the adaptation of these kind of services in healthcare are becoming increasingly com-
mon with cloud-based health recording and genomic data management tools such as
Microsoft Health. However, the widespread adaptation of location-based services poses
a threat to users because their personal data, such as location, health records, and some-
times even genomic data, is shared on the web without any guarantee of privacy.
In this work, we address the problem of searching privately on a database. We con-
sider the scenario that a user wants to send a search request to a server and would want
the server to learn nothing about his query. So, it makes sense that the user encrypts
his search using his public key and sends the cipher-text over to the server. We con-
sider the case where data over the server is not encrypted. This applies in particular
to queries sent to search engines. The case where the data over the server is encrypted
will be treated differently elsewhere. Our proposed scheme shall use a homomorphic
encryption scheme.
Homomorphic encryption allows computations to be carried out on the cipher-text
such that after decryption, the result would be the same as carrying out identical com-
putations on the plain-text. This has novel implications such as being able to carry out
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operations on database queries in the form of cipher-text and returning the result to the
user so that no information about the query is revealed at the server’s end [9].
The idea of homomorphic encryptions is not new, and even the oldest of ciphers,
ROT13 developed in ancient Rome, had homomorphic properties with respect to string
concatenations [7]. Certain modern ciphers such as RSA and El Gamal also support
homomorphic multiplication of cipher texts [7].
The idea of a “fully” homomorphic encryption scheme (or privacy homomorphism)
which supports two homomorphic operations was first introduced by Rivest, Adleman,
and Dertouzous in 1978 [6]. After more than three decades, the first fully homomorphic
encryption scheme was founded by Gentry in 2009 with his breakthrough construction
of a lattice based cryptosystem that supports both homomorphic additions and multi-
plications [8]. Although the lattice based system is not used in practice, it paved the
way for many other simpler and more efficient fully homomorphic models constructed
afterwards.
At a high level, Gentry’s idea can be described by the following general model. This
is the blueprint that is used in all homomorphic encryption schemes that followed.
1. Develop a Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Scheme that is restricted to evalu-
ating a finite number of additions or multiplications.
2. Modify the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme to make it Bootstrappable,
that is, modifying it so that it could evaluate its own decryption circuit plus at least
one additional NAND gate.
Every probabilistic encryption function usually introduces a noise and when the noise
exceeds a certain threshold, the decryption function does not return the desired plain-
text. The idea behind constructing a bootstrappable scheme is that whenever the noise
level is about to reach the threshold, we can bootstrap the cipher-text and get a new
cipher-text so that these cipher-texts decrypt to the same pain-text but the new cipher-
text will have a lower noise. In this way, if the cipher-text is bootstrapped from time to
time, an arbitrary number of operations can be carried out.
Our work improves upon a method proposed by Gahi et al. [3] to homomorphi-
cally encrypt database queries. Their work specifically uses the DGHV fully homomor-
phic encryption scheme [4]. The DGHV scheme operates on plain-text bits separately,
and thus Gahi’s method requires a large amount of computations to perform even on
a simple operation such as integer multiplication. We propose an alternative to Gahi’s
method, which we call Homomorphic Query Processing. Our method is not restricted to
the DGHV scheme and can be used with more modern fully homomorphic encryption
schemes. For example, using our Homomorphic Query Processing technique with the
more recent ring based fully homomorphic encryption scheme proposed by Braserski
et al. [5], which work on blocks of data (such as integers) rather than single bits (as in
Gahi’s scheme), the number of computations can be greatly reduced.
2 DGHV Fully Homomorphic Encryption
The DGHV scheme was introduced by Marten van Dijk, Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi, and
Vinod Vaikuntanathan in 2010, and this scheme operates on integers as opposed to lat-
tices in Gentry’s original construction. The scheme follows Gentry’s original blueprint
by first constructing a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme. The key generation,
encryption and decryption algorithms of the DGHV scheme are given below.
Let λ ∈ N be the security parameter and set N = λ, P = λ2 and Q = λ5. The
scheme is based on the following algorithms;
– KeyGen(λ): The key generation algorithm that randomly chooses a P -bit integer p
as the secret key.
– Enc(m, p): The bit m ∈ {0, 1} is encrypted by
c = m′ + pq,
where m′ ≡ m (mod 2) and q, m′ are random Q-bit and N -bit numbers, respec-
tively. Note that we can also write the cipher-text as c = m + 2r + pq since
m′ = m+ 2r for some r ∈ Z.
– Dec(c, p): Output (c mod p) mod 2 where (c mod p) is the integer c′ in (−p/2, p/2)
such that p divides c− c′.
The value m′ is called the noise of the cipher-text. Note that this scheme, as it is given
above, is symmetric (i.e., it only has a private key). We can define the public key as a
random subset sum of encryptions of zeros, that is, the public key is a randomly choosen
sum from a predefined set of encryptions of zeros: S = {2r1+pq1, 2r2+pq2, . . . , 2rn+
pqn}. A typical encryption of the plain-text m would be,
c = m+
∑
i∈T
(2ri + pqi)
= m+ 2
∑
i∈T
ri + p
∑
i∈T
qi,
where T ⊆ S. From here on we shall use m′ to denote m +∑i∈T ri and q to denote∑
i∈T qi.
This scheme is homomorphic with respect to addition and multiplication and de-
crypts correctly as long as the noise level does not exceed p/2 in absolute value. That
is, |m′| < p/2. Hence, this is a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme in the sense
that once the noise level exceeds p/2, the scheme loses its homomorphic ability. It is
shown that this scheme is Bootstrappable.
3 Query Processing Using the DGHV Scheme
The DGHV scheme can be used to create a protocol that establishes blind searching in
databases. This method was proposed by Gahi et al. [3].
Suppose we need to retrieve a particular record from the database. Typically, we
send a query to the database encrypted using the DGHV scheme. Let vi be the ith bit
of the query v and ci be the ith bit of a record R in database D. Both the query and
the database record is encrypted using the DGHV scheme. Suppose the plain-text bit
corresponding to vi is mi and the plain-text bit corresponding to ci is m′i. Then,
vi = mi + 2ri + pqi
and
ci = m
′
i + 2r
′
i + pq
′
i,
where ri, r′i, qi and q
′
i are random numbers and p is the secret key. The server shall
compute the following sum for each record Rt with index t:
It =
∏
i
(1 + ci + vi). (1)
(v1, v2, v3, v4, v5)“Query”→ (m1,m2,m3,m4,m5)
Alice Bob
(c1, c2, c3, c4, c5)
(m1,m2,m3,m4,m5)
DGHV−−−−→ (v1, v2, v3, v4, v5) Calculates
5∏
i=1
(1 + vi + ci)
Fig. 1. Calculation of Ir values.
We observe that
1 + ci + vi = 1 + (mi +m
′
i) + 2(ri + r
′
i) + p(qi + q
′
i).
So, if mi = m′i, then mi +m
′
i ≡ 0 mod 2. In this case:
1 + ci + vi = Enc(1).
On the other hand, if mi 6= m′i, then mi +m′i ≡ 1 mod 2. Therefore,
1 + ci + vi = 2(1 + ri + r
′
i) + p(qi + q
′
i)
= Enc(0).
This results in It = Enc(0). Hence, for each record Rt in the database we will have an
It value that is equal to Enc(1) or Enc(0) depending on whether the search query m
matches Rt or not.
Next, we calculate the partial sums of the It values:
Sr =
∑
t≤r
It. (2)
Database Records Ir Sr
(1, 1, 0, 0) Enc(1) Enc (1)
(1, 0, 1, 0) Enc(0) Enc (1)
(1, 1, 0, 0) Enc(1) Enc (2)
(1, 1, 0, 1) Enc(0) Enc (2)
(1, 0, 0, 0) Enc(0) Enc (2)
Table 1. Sample database with corresponding Ir and Sr values
As an example, let us consider a database that has five records, each encoded with
4 bits. If the query sent by the user is (Enc(1),Enc(1),Enc(0),Enc(0)), we obtain the
corresponding Ir and Sr values, as shown in Table 1.
Next, we calculate the sequence (I ′r,j) for every record Rr with index r and every
positive integer j ≤ r:
I ′r,j = Ir
∏
i
(1 + j¯i + Sr,i), (3)
where Sr,i is the ith bit of Sr and j¯i represents the ith bit of the encryption of j. Hence,
these sequences have the property that whenever Ir = Enc(1) and Sr = Enc(j), we
have I ′r,j = Enc(1). Otherwise, I
′
r,j = Enc(0). Following the example given in Table
1, we get
(I ′1) = (Enc(1)),
(I ′2) = (Enc(0),Enc(0)),
(I ′3) = (Enc(0),Enc(1),Enc(0)),
(I ′4) = (Enc(0),Enc(0),Enc(0),Enc(0)),
(I ′5) = (Enc(0),Enc(0),Enc(0),Enc(0),Enc(0)).
Finally, we calculate,
(R′) =
∑
k
Enc(Rk)(I ′k), (4)
where Rk is the kth record in D. So, (R′) is a sequence containing only the encrypted
records that matches our search query. Note that the definition of (R′) relies on adding
vectors of different lengths. This is done in the natural way, whereby all the vectors are
made the same length by padding with zeros prior to addition. In the above example,
we obtain,
(R′) = (Enc(R1),Enc(R3),Enc(0),Enc(0)).
At this point, the sequence (R′) will contain all the records that match our query, but
with trailing encryptions of zeros we do not need. Hence, a second sum is calculated at
the server side to determine the number of terms that are useful in the sequence:
n =
∑
r
Ir
This result can be returned to the user and decrypted to obtain the number of records that
match the search query. Hence, the sequence (R′) can be truncated at the appropriate
point and returned to the user for decryption. The whole process is illustrated in Figure
2.
(v1, v2, v3, v4, v5)
“Query”→ (1, 1, 0, 0, 0)
Alice
Bob
(1, 1, 0, 0, 0)
DGHV−−−−→ (v1, v2, v3, v4, v5)
∑
r
Ir
Dec
(∑
r
Ir, sk
)
= 2
(Enc(R1),Enc(R3))
Fig. 2. Alice, Bob, and Gahi’s Protocol.
An update query can be performed by,
Rnew = (1 + Ir)R+ IrU, for every R ∈ D,
where U is the new value that we wish to insert whenever the query matchesR (or Ir =
Enc(1)). A deletion of a record can be performed by,
Rnew = (1 + Ir)R for every R ∈ D.
To perform all these operations without exceeding the maximum noise permitted (p/2),
it is necessary to choose the parameters N,P, and Q appropriately.
Gahi’s method works on plain-text bits and thus requires significant computational
ability on the part of the server. This is due to the fact that it is restricted to the DGHV
scheme which processes plain-text bits separately. Now we propose an alternative pro-
tocol called the Homomorphic Query Processing Scheme. This protocol enables us to
process database queries using more modern fully homomorphic encryption schemes
such as the ring based scheme proposed by Braserski et al. [5], which acts on blocks of
plain-text rather than single bits.
4 Homomorphic Query Processing
The main drawback in Gahi’s method is that it requires an enormous number of ho-
momorphic operations because it employs the DGHV encryption scheme, which uses
bitwise encryption. We propose an alternative protocol calledHomomorphic Query Pro-
cessing that is compatible with the more recent ring-based fully homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme introduced by Braserski et al. [5]. The major advantage is that Braserski’s
method works on plain-text and cipher-text blocks and thus the number of homomor-
phic operations required can be greatly reduced.
We first give a brief introduction to the ring based fully homomorphic Encryption
Scheme proposed by Braserski, and then proceed to define our Homomorphic Query
Processing method.
4.1 Ring Based Fully Homomorphic Encryption
This encryption scheme was introduced by Braserski, et al [5] and operates on the
polynomial ring R = Z[X]/ 〈f(x)〉; the ring of polynomials with integer coefficients
modulo f(x), where,
f(x) =
∏
1≤k≤n
gcd(k,n)=1
(
x− e2ipi kn
)
,
is the nth cyclomatic polynomial. The plain-text space is the ring Rt = Zt[x]/ 〈f(x)〉,
where t is an integer. The key generation and encryption functions make use of two dis-
tributions χkey and χerr on R for generating small elements. The uniform distribution
χkey is used in the key generation, and the discrete Gaussian distribution χerr is used
to sample small noise polynomials. Specific details can be found in [10] and [5]. The
scheme is based on the following algorithms.
– KeyGen(n, q, t, χkey, χerr): Operating on the input degree n and moduli q and
t, this algorithm generates the public and private keys (pk, sk) = (h, f), where
f = [tf ′ + 1]q and h = [tgf−1]q . Here, the key generation algorithm samples
small polynomials from the key distribution f ′, g → χkey such that f is invertible
modulo q and [.]q denotes coefficients of polynomials in R reduced by modulo q.
– Encrypt(h,m): Given a message m ∈ R, the Encrypt algorithm samples small
error polynomials s, e→ χerr and outputs, c = [bq/tc[m]t + e+ hs]q ∈ R, where
b.c denotes the floor function.
– Decrypt(f, c): Given a cipher-text c, this algorithm outputs, m =
[⌊
t
q [fc]q
⌉]
t
∈
R.
– Add(c1, c2): Given two cipher-texts c1 and c2, this algorithm outputs cadd(c1, c2) =
[c1 + c2]q .
– Mult(c1, c2): Multiplication of cipher-texts is performed in two steps. First, com-
pute c˜mult =
[⌊
t
q c1c2
⌉]
q
. However, this result cannot be decrypted to the original
plain-text using the decryption key f . Therefore, a process known as key switching
is done to transform the cipher-text so that it can be decrypted with the original
secret key. For more details, we refer to [10].
This encryption scheme is homomorphic with respect to addition and multiplication
of plain-texts modulo t. The main advantage in using Braserski’s encryption scheme is
that it can be used to encrypt blocks of plain-text instead of dealing with single bits, as
in the DGHV scheme [4]. For example, consider the block of plain-text bits, 10100. The
integer representation of this block is the value 20. We can represent this integer using
the polynomial X2 + X4 =
∑4
i=0 2
izi, where zi is the ith bit of 10100. In general, if
z is an integer and its binary representation is, z = (±1)∑li=0 2izi, where zi ∈ {0, 1}
and l = dlog2 |z|e, then we can encode the number z as
∑l
i=0 ziX
i ∈ R.
4.2 Converting the plain-text space into a Field
As we shall see, in ourHomomorphic Query Processingmethod, we invert certain plain-
text elements and thus the plain-text space should be a field. Therefore, we now discuss
how to convert the plain-text ring in Braserski’s method to a field. Note that the plain-
text space in Braserski’s method is defined on the polynomial ring,Rt = Zt[x]/ 〈f(x)〉.
We shall select t = p, where p is a prime number. Then Rp is a field if and only if f is
irreducible over Zp. Recall that f is the nth cyclomatic polynomial defined as follows:
f(x) =
∏
1≤k≤n
gcd(k,n)=1
(
x− e2ipi kn
)
Let f(x) = (x − α1)(x − α2) . . . (x − αn) be a polynomial defined on Q[x]. The
discriminant of f , denoted by ∆(f), is defined [11] as,
∆(f) =
∏
i<j
(αi − αj)2
It has been proved in [11] that the nth cyclotomic polynomial reduces modulo all primes
if and only if the discriminant of the nth cyclotomic polynomial is a square in Z. Hence,
by choosing a cyclotomic polynomial whose discriminant is not a square we can find
a prime p such that f is irreducible over Zp. Furthermore, it is shown in [11] that
whenever the discriminant of a cyclotomic polynomial f is not a square in Z, there
exist infinitely many primes such that f is irreducible over Zp. Thus, we can choose a
cyclotomic polynomial with non-square discriminant and check for irreducibility using
a standard polynomial irreducibility test such as Rabin’s test, until we obtain a prime
for which the cyclotomic polynomial is irreducible. For example, even if we consider
a large cyclotomic polynomial with non-square discriminant like the 107th cyclotomic
(which has degree 106), and consider the primes less than 100, it can be seen that it is
irreducible over many primes: Z2,Z5,Z7,Z17,Z31,Z43,Z59,Z67,Z71,Z73 and Z97.
We now propose our Homomorphic Query Processing scheme, which is compati-
ble with the Braserski’s ring based fully homomorphic encryption scheme mentioned
previously.
4.3 Homomorphic Query Processing
We begin by defining the value Fi for the ith record (denoted by Ri) in the database.
We write Enc(m) for the Enc(m, pk), where pk is the public key of the user. Then the
user sends Enc(m) to the server to search for the records that match m. Now, the server
computes the following:
Fi =
(∏
Enc(m−Rk)
)(∏
Enc (Ri −Rk)−1
)
, (5)
where each of the products above is over all the records Rk such that Rk 6= Ri.
Since we are dealing with a fully homomorphic encryption scheme, we can compute
Enc(m − Rk) values by computing Enc(m) − Enc(Rk). Also, since all the Ri values
are known to the server, the term
∏
Rk 6=Ri Enc (Ri −Rk)
−1 can be reduced to a sim-
pler form using the homomorphic property of the encryption scheme in order to perform
a single encryption. That idea of defining the Fi’s in this way was inspired by Lagrange
Interpolating Polynomials. Indeed, we have
Fi = Enc
 ∏
Rk 6=Ri
(m−Rk)
Enc
 ∏
Rk 6=Ri
(Ri −Rk)
−1
= Enc
 ∏
Rk 6=Ri
m−Rk
Ri −Rk

We remark that whenever m = Ri (query being equal to the record we are com-
paring), we have Fi = Enc(1) and Fi = Enc(0), otherwise. Note that here we are
assuming that the query is contained somewhere in the database. If the query is not
contained anywhere in the database, an encryption of something other than 1 or 0 will
be the output. This special scenario is discussed later.
Now, we define the partial sums of the Fi values as follows:
Gi =
∑
j≤i
Fj . (6)
Using these partial sums, we can then calculate the sequence (F ′i,k) corresponding
to each record as follows,
F ′i,k = Fi
∏
j 6=k
Gi − Enc(j)
Enc∏
j 6=k
(k − j)−1
 , (7)
where 1 ≤ k ≤ i. It can be seen that F ′i,k = Enc(1) if Fi = Enc(1) and Gi = Enc(k)
are both satisfied. Hence, the sequences (F ′i,k) have the property that whenever Fi =
Enc(1) (i.e., the ith record matches the query), we have an Enc(1) at the kth position of
the sequence where Gi = Enc(k). All other entries of the sequence are encryptions of
zero. Therefore,
(R′) =
∑
k
Enc(Rk)(F ′k), (8)
where Rk is the k-th record in D will give us a sequence containing only the encrypted
records that match our search query. Note that the definition of (R′) relies on adding
vectors of different lengths. This is done in the natural way, whereby all the vectors are
made the same length by padding with zeros prior to addition.
To further illustrate our scheme, let us consider an example where the database
contains five records, each with 4 bits of data. Also, let our encryption scheme encrypt
2 bits at a time. Then, if the search query is (Enc(2), Enc(3)), the corresponding Fi and
Gi values are given in Table 2.
Table 2. Sample database and corresponding Fi and Gi values
Database Records Fi Gi
(0, 0, 1, 0) Enc(0) Enc (0)
(1, 0, 1, 1) Enc(1) Enc (1)
(1, 0, 0, 1) Enc(0) Enc (1)
(1, 0, 1, 1) Enc(1) Enc (2)
(1, 1, 0, 0) Enc(0) Enc (2)
The resulting sequences (F ′i ) would be similar as in Gahi’s scheme,
(F ′1) = (Enc(0))
(F ′2) = (Enc(1),Enc(0))
(F ′3) = (Enc(0),Enc(0),Enc(0))
(F ′4) = (Enc(0),Enc(1),Enc(0),Enc(0))
(F ′5) = (Enc(0),Enc(0),Enc(0),Enc(0),Enc(0)).
Therefore, the sequence (R′) would be,
(R′) = (Enc(R2),Enc(R3),Enc(0),Enc(0),Enc(0))
At this point, the sequence (R′) will contain all the records that match our query but
with trailing encryptions of zeros which we do not need. Hence, a second sum is calcu-
lated at the server side to determine the number of terms that are useful in the sequence:
n =
∑
r
Fr.
Then n will be returned to the user and decrypted to obtain the number of records that
match the search query. Hence, the sequence (R′) can be truncated at the appropriate
point and returned to the user for decryption.
It should be noted that the server will know the number of records that match the
user’s query. We believe that this information is not sufficient for the server to gain
any additional information about the search query. Alternatively, we could return the
whole sequence without truncation, keeping the number of matching records private
from the server. However, the communication overhead will be increased significantly
in this case, since the length of the sequence will be equal to the number of records in
the database.
As promised previously, we now look at the special case where the record that
is searched for is not contained anywhere in the database. In this case the value Fi
will be something other than an encryption of 1 or 0. These garbage encrypted values
will carry themselves into the rest of the protocol, resulting in Equation (8) with a
nonsensical sequence. Hence, if the user receives a nonsensical sequence as the final
result, it implies that the record that was searched is not contained in the database. As
an alternative approach, we can compute
∏
i (Enc(m)− Enc(Ri)) prior to computing
the Fi in Equation (5) and send it to the user to decrypt. If the result is zero then m is
contained in the database, and if it is non-zero, m is not contained in the database and
therefore the user can send a message to the server to abort the search.
5 Comparison of Our Scheme vs. Gahi’s Scheme
Our scheme has the main advantage of having the potential to be used with more re-
cent fully homomorphic encryption schemes rather than being restricted to the DGHV
scheme. This gives the flexibility to use our method with block based encryption schemes
such as Braserski’s [5], which reduces the number of encryption steps. For example, re-
ferring back to Equation (1), we can see that the It values are calculated by comparing
the query with each record bit-wise. If there are m records in the database and each of
them are encrypted using n bits, the number of operations that are required to calcu-
late all the It values will be O(nm). In our Homomorphic Query Processing method,
Equation (5) acts as the analogue of Equation (1). However, the encryptions are done
block-wise in our scheme, and hence the number of operations it would take to calcu-
late the Fi value in Equation (5) will be O(m). For Equation (2) in Gahi’s method, the
number of operations that should be performed to calculate all the partial sums will be
O(nm2), since there areO(m2) multiplications and each multiplication should be done
bit-wise; whereas the calculation of partial sums in our scheme (Equation (6)), the num-
ber of operations is reduced to O(m2). Similarly, equations 3 and 4 in Gahi’s method
use O(nm) and O(nm2) number of operations, respectively, but their counterparts in
our scheme, (equations 7 and 8) haveO(m) andO(m2) operations, respectively. Thus,
it can be seen that in each step of our scheme, the number of operations performed is
reduced by a factor of n compared to Gahi’s method.
References
1. K. Zickuhr, Location Based Services URL: http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/
09/12/location-based-services/ [accessed: 2016-01-16].
2. M. Kaku, Physics of the Future, Anchor Books, 2012.
3. Y. Gahi, M. Guennoun, and K. El-Khatib, A Secure Database System using Homomorphic
Encryption Schemes, The Third International Conference on Advances in Databases, Knowl-
edge, and Data Applications, 2011.
4. M. van Dijk, C. Gentry, S. Halevi, and V. Vaikuntanathan, Fully Homomorphic Encryption
over the Integers, Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2010, 6110 24-43, 2010.
5. Z. Braserski, V. Vaikuntanathan, Fully Homomorphic Encryption from Ring-LWE and Security
for Key Dependent Messages, Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO, 6841 505-524, 2011.
6. R.L. Rivest, A. Shamir, L. Adleman, A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-
Key Cryptosystems, Communications of the ACM, 21 120-126, 1978.
7. H. Hesse and C. Matthies, Introduction to Homomorphic Encryption, Cloud Security Mecha-
nisms, December 2013.
8. C. Gentry, A fully homomorphic encryption scheme, PhD Thesis, Stanford University, 2009.
9. D. Boneh, C. Gentry, S. Halevi, F. Wang, D.J. Wu, Private Database Queries Using Somewhat
Homomorphic Encryption, Applied Cryptography and Network Security, 7954 102-118, 2013.
10. J.W. Bos, K. Lauter, J. Loftus, and M. Naehrig, Improved Security for a Ring-Based Fully
Homomorphic Encryption Scheme Cryptography and Coding – 14th IMA International Con-
ference, Springer Lecture notes in computer science, 8308 45–64, 2013.
11. B. Harrison, On the Reducibility of Cyclotomic Polynomials over Finite Fields The American
Mathematical Monthly, 114 813-818, 2007.
12. T. Dierks, Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, https://tools.ietf.
org/html/rfc5246 August 2008.
